

DEMOCRATIC PARADOXES: PLURALISM, SOLIDARITY, AND THE PORTUGUESE STATE

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Several years ago my wife and I were spending a few summer weeks in our house south of the Rio Tejo, just outside Vila Nogueira de Azeitão. Since it lies within the Parque Natural de Arrábida, where most new construction is forbidden, the house has an unobstructed view of Lisbon about 30 kilometers to the northwest. For three nights we beheld what appeared to be an apocalyptic spectacle. Fires blazed like a gaudy necklace around Lisbon, and every morning smoke curled over the valley before us.

The fires finally subsided. Hunters furious at legislation that proposed to bar them from private lands had torched several *quintas* in protest. I forget what the exact outcome of their protest was — whether the law was revoked. In any event, apocalypse was avoided.

There may be a parable here. Two to three decades ago, civic engagement was high — presumably healthy though perhaps a bit feverish — in Portugal. Now it seems low, certainly in comparison to what it was in the early days of the Revolution. Cross-national comparisons are less devastating, since social capital has declined almost everywhere during this period. On balance, political participation in Portugal looks to be toward the middle or lower-middle range of OECD countries.¹ If the country has become, as Vítor Alves puts it, *um Portugal abúlico*, it is not unique in this respect.²

The fact that Portugal has avoided the worst — that the political system has averted collapse — is cold comfort to those who expected better of the breakthrough that launched the third wave of democratization.³ And even if Portugal approaches normality in a statistical sense, a puzzle remains.

The puzzle applies to *all* countries in which civic engagement has declined over the past decades. While education — that classic booster of political participation — has increased, civic involvement has declined. How can this be? We do not know for sure. The puzzle is all the more striking in the case of Portugal, where educational attainment has not just increased but has skyrocketed since the sixties and seventies.⁴

I cannot unravel this paradox here, though I can offer a speculative answer. Economists know that as income increases, people tend not only to consume more goods and services but to purchase different *kinds* of goods and services. The composition of household budgets shifts from subsistence (food and housing) to discretionary expenditures (travel, etc.). Something similar may happen with the effect of education on political behavior. What impetus

¹José M. Magone, 'The Quality of Portuguese Democracy in the European Union,' presented at the Conference on Portuguese Democracy, 10-12 November 2004, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa.

²Entrevista com Vítor Alves, *Diário de Notícias* (11 Novembro 2004), 14. See also Adelino Gomes, 'Democracia está doente em Portugal e tem de ser tratada,' *Público* (13 Novembro 2004), 16.

³Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

⁴Economic Survey—Portugal 2004: Structural Policies to Lift Portugal's Living Standards, OECD website <http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0>.

education gives to civic involvement or to traditional political participation might be diverted across a range of non-political alternatives and life-styles. This cannot be the whole story. The account does not consider the historical circumstances that give rise to 'non-political alternatives and life-styles' in the first place. However this might be, politics has a lot to compete with. It is one activity among many that may or may not appeal to the 'tastes' of citizens, consumers, and spectators.

This puzzle aside, three other questions about social capital and political action are important. One is deceptively factual. What is the state of civic involvement? Has it declined in Portugal? Conventional political behavior — as measured by electoral turnout, for example — has gone down.⁵ At the same time, other forms of political activity—for example, participation in local committees — may have increased, at least in some regions. Developments like these tend to elude empirical evaluation. The optimistic diagnosis is that Portugal is going through the trough of a transitional phase. Old forms of participation are waning. The new ones on the horizon have yet to be consolidated.

The second question is: what drives the rise or fall of civic engagement? No single factor provides a full answer, and it is not an easy chore to weigh the relative significance of multiple causes. The same suspects that have been shown to operate in the US — e.g., heavy television viewing, long commutes back and forth to work — no doubt operate in Portugal as well.⁶

But another cause may be more expressly political. Over time, as they judge the performance of the political system to be inadequate, citizens may simply become less inclined to pay attention to and get involved in politics. The decline in trust in the political class hints that some such phenomenon is at work in Portugal. In comparison to other ways of passing the time, politics comes to be seen as an irrelevant nuisance, without even much entertainment value (except perhaps in cases like the Casa Pia scandals and the antics of especially colorful regional politicians). According to this scenario, *desencanto* with government performance drives down political participation. As long as the government avoids doing something completely outrageous, chronic complaint rather than widespread mobilization is likely to be the response. Democracy ends, to paraphrase T.S. Eliot, not with a bang but with a whimper.⁷

A third question is tied up with the second even though it appears at first glance to be analytically separate. Apart from its causes, we can ask: what *effect* does political participation have?

Running through much of the early literature on social capital was the supposition that civic engagement was a good thing not only in itself, as a school of democratic habits, but also because it gave citizens influence over policy decisions. 'Empowerment', like 'self-esteem', was supposed to be practical as well as virtuous. But if the effects of civic engagement are paltry or

⁵André Freire and Pedro Magalhães, *A abstenção eleitoral em Portugal* (Lisboa: ICS, 2002).

⁶Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

⁷For analysis of political apathy in industrial democracies, much of it applicable to Portugal, see John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs about How Government Should Work* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Louis Menand, 'The Unpolitical Animal: How Political Science Understands Voters,' *New Yorker* (20 Agosto 2004), 92-96.

non-existent, then the cost-effectiveness of such involvement as an instrument for shaping policy drops off.⁸

Political engagement may thrive as an expression of sociality. This is a non-trivial benefit. But the instrumental payback of civic engagement diminishes as the link between behavior and influence on policy grows thin. From this perspective, the putative effect, or non-effect, of civic engagement turns out to be a cause of the decline in civic engagement.⁹

This perverse result may reinforce a culture of complaint. The *estado cívico* becomes a *estado crítico*. Expecting little from the government in the way of effectiveness, citizens can still vent their frustration as a form of catharsis. Talk is cheap.

Let us suppose, in answer to the first question, that the level and quality of civic engagement in Portugal is at best modest. There is, to be sure, a good deal of surmise in this 'conclusion,' especially since it does not take systematically into account the possible spread of embryonic forms or subcultures of participation. Still, as a working hypothesis, it is plausible.

Let us suppose, further, that this decline is a joint product of social trends (the saturation effects of the mass media, etc.) and a popular perception of incompetence on the part of the government. We arrive at a circularity of cause and effect. The citizenry is marginally more sophisticated, and the government is an easy target for what, under an authoritarian regime, would be considered populist abuse or *lèse majesté*. The circle, if it is not vicious and entirely closed, is dispiriting. Civic engagement, so it seems, generates fewer advantages than was thought. A demoralization with democracy sets in, feeding on itself.

This pessimistic diagnosis may be correct. Whether Portuguese democracy is in mortal crisis or whether it is suffering, like a few other industrial democracies, from an advanced case of the Italian disease may seem like a distinction too fine to matter. Forecasts of catastrophic versus incremental demise come out the same in the end.¹⁰ But this smacks of hasty reasoning. Like all sweeping assessments, the judgment could benefit from greater attention to specifics. We need to consider the particulars of the Portuguese experience. This way, we may be able to envision mechanisms that could help set things right.

The primary theme of the presentations at the Congresso was the decay of civic engagement. The other great theme, so prominent that it is probably tied for first place, was the ineffectiveness of the Portuguese state. These concerns are intertwined, though they can be viewed in very different ways. From one perspective, the debility of civic engagement contributes to the dysfunctionality of government, that is, to its less-than-responsive character. From another perspective, the opposite etiology emerges. It is the ineptness of the

⁸See Nina Eliasoph, *Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁹Another argument is that citizens are disinclined to care much about elections and similar machinery of classical democracy if they feel they can influence the government through petitions, protests, consultative mechanisms, and so on. In this view, what might look like apathy is rational and healthy. See John E. Mueller, *Capitalism, Democracy, and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

¹⁰Compare Laurence Whitehead, 'Bowling in the Bronx: The Uncivil Interstices between Civil and Political Society,' pp. 22-42 in *Civil Society in Democratization*, eds. Peter Burnell & Peter Calvert (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

government that creates disincentives for participation and fosters political escapism.

The fact that cause and effect run both ways indicates that the political ecosystem of Portugal, like that of other regimes, is recursive. This truism is both too technical and too general to be helpful. More to the point is the idea that the legacy (partially unintended) of *25 de Abril* has been to privilege the bottom-up, civil society perspective and to assign a lower priority to the reform of the Portuguese state.

This legacy downplays or overlooks some turning points in Portuguese history—notably, the weakness of the state at the time of the Revolution and the degradation of its capacity immediately afterwards. Unlike Spain under the aegis of Opus Dei technocrats during the last decade-and-a-half of Francoism, the *Estado Novo* never underwent a period of economic rationalization. Salazar held strongly to an antiquated economic vision. The Generalissimo knew little economics and left that to ambitious counselors. The result (to make a long story short) gave a boost to economic development and bureaucratic renovation in Spain.

By contrast, the rupture of the early revolutionary period in Portugal exacerbated the weakness of the state.¹¹ Some aftershocks of this breakdown linger today. The most striking is the *fuga ao fisco*. Indicators that measure the central government's success in extracting tax revenues place Portugal toward the bottom of OECD countries. The asymmetry between receipts and expenditure obligations looks very dysfunctional.

The practical and potentially hopeful implication of this problem is that it constitutes a focused challenge, in contrast to the rather diffuse malaise in civil society. To the degree that the problem of fiscal capacity is concrete, it is likely to be fixable. It is less a question of technical know-how than political will.

This still poses serious difficulties, even if an opportunity is discernible. Governance in Portugal appears to have reached what economists term a 'low-level equilibrium.' People bemoan the sorry performance of government, the irresponsibility of the political class, and so on. Yet serious reform looks unappetizing because, for many, the required surgery might upset a defective but tolerable status quo. Structural change, it is feared, might make a bad situation worse.

I am thinking particularly of the neo-conservative constraints set against the *ideário* of the Revolution by the individualistic leanings of *retornados* and by Portuguese citizens in *diáspora*. These form a powerful constituency. The constituency has acted benignly, as a gyroscope, steering politics away from extremes. But it can also act as a veto group against institutional change that could ensure the solvency of the state.

A number of transitologists have stressed state-building as a component of democratization just as important as political emancipation.¹² Indeed, the theoretical division between 'efficacy' and 'legitimacy' goes back a long way. (Portuguese democracy, like Fernando Pessoa—and like other democracies—has multiple personalities.) Omar Encarnación has provided one of the most

¹¹Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995).

¹²Atul Kohli, *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).

provocative recent studies of this tradeoff, and it is one that speaks directly to the Portuguese trajectory.¹³

Encarnación challenges the conventional wisdom of social capital analysts in the Tocquevillean school, namely, that low levels of social capital are detrimental to democracy. He first draws an analogy between the standard social capital approach and modernization theory. This theory once predicted a happy fit between economic development and the onset of democracy. Both theories propagate an unduly linear causal evolution. Encarnación's initial point is that the expectation of a close link between a flourishing civil society and the promotion of a viable democracy is ingenuous.

The more striking argument arises from Encarnación's comparison between Brazil and Spain. He notes that civic engagement is high in Brazil and low in Spain. The catch, Encarnación contends, is that Brazilian democracy has turned out to be unsteady and, for many citizens, unsatisfactory, whereas democracy in Spain enjoys broad support and has been a substantial success.¹⁴ The development of civil society is one thing, the flourishing of democracy another. Whatever connection obtains between the two is less straightforward than advocates of the benign effects of social capital would like to believe.

This non-obvious claim is worth considering even if the evidence for it is mixed and a little selective.¹⁵ The crucial variable appears to be the discretion available to, and the judgment exercised by, power-holders and contenders for power in forging the instruments of governance. Institutional design and the political imagination that goes into improving it make a difference by allowing democracy to be effective as well as legitimate. Mechanisms for consultation that guarantee a modicum of influence (perceived as well as real) over policy may matter more than vehicles of participation that look rather undirected. The latter may be unchanneled, like a locomotive racing off the tracks. A strategy emphasizing institutional design and governmental leadership seems more feasible than frontal attacks on the deficiencies of a somewhat nebulous authoritarian culture.

A good example of such ingenuity in Portugal is the evolving relation between the offices of the president and the prime minister. To an outsider like myself, more familiar with the organizational details of Spanish politics, this looks quite similar to the division of labor between the monarch and the prime minister in Spain (or indeed between the president and prime minister in Ireland). The Portuguese president, like the Spanish King, serves as a kind of

¹³Omar G. Encarnación, *The Myth of Civil Society: Social Capital and Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Brazil* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

¹⁴See also John Grimond, 'The Second Transition: After 30 years of economic and political success, Spain is entering a new phase of democratic development,' *The Economist* (26 junho 2004).

¹⁵Encarnación's treatment of social capital is elastic. Sometimes the term refers to associational membership. More often it is used to mean 'trust,' a psychological condition that may or may not be generated by membership. The difference is important because, by this logic, a country can be high on trust but low on social capital as membership. The point is somewhat confusing. One can imagine a condition of low membership/high trust—Salazar's reign over a benighted populace might qualify—and wonder what is democratic about it. However, this problem does not undermine Encarnación's main point: civic engagement and/or social capital without institutional arrangements that allow for consultation and expertise will produce an overheated democracy. Though he does not use the term, Encarnación seems to reviving the notion of 'the relative autonomy of the state.'

psychological anchor that steadies a fractious polity. Evidently, however, this division of symbolic and 'real' power, though necessary and probably beneficial, is not sufficient to keep Portuguese democracy on track.

How might a democratic denouement of the sort praised by Encarnación come about? A confluence of strategic, political, and fortuitous changes appears to be crucial. Here a comparison of Portugal with Ireland is appropriate. The similarities are numerous. Both countries are predominantly Catholic, both are ethnically homogeneous, both have experienced high rates of emigration, both have customarily been skeptical of outright liberalism, and both remained economic backwaters through most of the twentieth century. Though the Irish Republic operated as a democracy from the 1920s, its political culture can hardly be said to have been pluralistic. De Valera and Salazar, virtual contemporaries, nurtured similarly primitive ideals of a pristine, oddly Gandhi-like agrarianism. Both were enamored of corporatism, though the version De Valera promoted had deeper clerical roots.

The great leap forward that Ireland has made since the 1980s stems from a variety of factors. These include a highly educated (and English-speaking) workforce, together with a unique (and probably unrepeatable) policy of granting enormous albeit temporary tax breaks to foreign corporations. Another decisive factor was a generational change in entrepreneurial and administrative leadership. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, at the same time that Opus Dei técnicos gained policy influence in Spain, a small cohort of 'reform-mongers' (many with Northern, Protestant backgrounds) began to overturn the obscurantism of the De Valera generation and to rationalize the Irish bureaucracy and its economic strategy.¹⁶ By the 1990s, after many fits and starts, this revolution-from-above began to pay off.¹⁷

Parts of the Irish model, such as it is, may be applicable to Portugal. It is not just that a cultural transformation favoring development has taken place in Ireland. It is also the case that this transformation has been translated into institutional understandings that open the way for improvisation and creative alliances between government, economic interests, and social actors.¹⁸

My doubts arise from a suspicion that elites in Portugal tend to be ideologically more polarized than their Irish counterparts. The problem is political viability and perhaps imagination more than a dearth of administrative talent.

The Irish Republic by itself, setting the question of Northern Ireland aside, has been better known for machine politics and compromise than ideological contention in the class warfare sense. All this camaraderie has a strong element of cronyism, but it also reflects a certain ideological consensus. The differences between Irish leadership cadres—for example, whether they were educated by the Jesuits or the Christian Brothers—look trifling compared to the militant, radical, and professorial-deductive style common in parts of the Portuguese political class. For all this, remember that Portuguese political culture has usually been considered *less* given to extremes

¹⁶ Tom Garvin, *Preventing the Future: Why Was Ireland So Poor for So Long?* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2004).

¹⁷ Frank Barry, *Understanding Ireland's Economic Growth* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

¹⁸ Brian Nolan, Philip J. O'Connell & Christopher Whalen, eds., *Bust to Boom? The Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2000).

than that of Spain, and look how fervently moderate and statesmanlike the Spaniards became!¹⁹

Passion is no doubt one prerequisite for political engagement. So too, for democracy, is patience.²⁰ To some, the fact that Portugal has gradually developed a two-party system or something very close to it merely contributes to a boredom with restricted political alternatives that drives citizens to tune out. To others, it is a sign of moderation and maturity.

The twin (and I believe justified) preoccupations of the Congresso have been the debility of civic involvement and the inefficacy of the state in Portugal. These themes were virtually obsessive during the two days of deliberations in Lisbon. I also noticed one theme that was conspicuous by its absence. This concerns the role of religion in the 30 years since the Revolution and, more interestingly, its possible role over the next 30 years or so.

Let me admit that while this absence may really be a problem in the sense of neglect or professional obtuseness, it may also reflect little more than an idiosyncrasy on my part. After studying democratization in Brazil and Spain and a few other places, I have turned to an investigation of changes in the Catholic church.²¹ It could be that I am primed to see spirits and demons that have nothing to do with Portuguese reality.

Of course, religion does matter in Portuguese politics in a way that has been familiar for a long time and that needs no repetition here. It is expressed in the division between a traditionally religious and conservative North and a traditionally anticlerical and leftist South. And as an organization the Catholic church continues to play an important role in the public sphere—for example, through the *Misericórdias*—even though clerical numbers have declined sharply.²²

This said, there is at least one other way in which religion may be, or may become, of interest to the question of civic participation and to the quality of Portuguese democracy. In several countries over the past decades, roughly synchronous with the evolution of the new political dispensation in Portugal, religion has taken on a mobilizing force quite at odds with the opium-of-the-proletariat thesis embedded in vulgar Marxism and modernization theory. Rather than inducing apathy and other-worldliness, religious sentiment has galvanized social and political movements.²³ Contrary to expectations, instead of holding back participation and civic engagement, religion has acted as a stimulus to such behavior in many places.

Though the left-versus-right terminology is imprecise, much of the nexus of religion and politics has had a conservative tenor (Islamic fundamentalism, evangelical Protestantism in the U.S.). However, some has been progressive

¹⁹Peter McDonough et al., *The Cultural Dynamics of Democratization in Spain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

²⁰Jeff Goodwin et al., eds., *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

²¹Peter McDonough, *Men Astutely Trained: A History of the Jesuits in the American Century* (New York: Free Press, 1992) and McDonough & Eugene C. Bianchi, *Passionate Uncertainty: Inside the American Jesuits* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

²²Alexandra Correia e Manuel Vilas Boas, 'Terá a Igreja virada à esquerda?', *Visão* 552 (2 Outubro 2003).

²³Peter McDonough et al., 'Democratization and Participation: Comparing Spain, Brazil, and Korea', *Journal of Politics* 60 (1998) and Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

(liberation theology, the civil rights movement in the U.S.) In any event the point I wish to make does not bear directly on ideology. I want to stress instead the unexpected mobilizing and social capital generating role of religious attachment. In the U.S. as well as in many other countries, a significant portion of associational density can be accounted for in terms of membership in religious groups. We do not have to assume that this civic energy takes explicitly political form, in the sense of trying to influence public policy, to recognize its social presence and, vaguely, its political potential.

Portugal, and most of Europe for that matter, may be an exception to the reversal of secularization that prevails elsewhere.²⁴ Nevertheless, over the course of the next 30 years, scenarios that take the political potential of religion seriously are probably worth looking at. These dimly lit futures probably have as much to do with the emergence of new forms of religious life and the alliances such groups enter into as they do with the fate of institutional Catholicism.

One factor behind all this is demographic. New sources of immigration and the complex reactions to this influx on the part of a traditionally emigrant nation will continue to change the country once known as 'the land of graceful stagnation.' The demographic reconfiguration of Portugal will be the product not only of new waves of immigration but of the aging of the 'native' population itself. Both dynamics have momentum throughout Western Europe, so much so that expressions of concern about 'self-extinction' have become commonplace.²⁵

This raises another set of issues that I heard almost nothing about at the Congresso, perhaps because I attended the 'democracy' (process?) and not the 'development' (substance?) sessions. The issues are related less to religion than to a need to rethink received conceptions of the *estado social*. The structural bases on which the architecture of the welfare was erected, in Portugal and other European countries, are shifting. The shrinkage and aging of the population, the decline of family stability, heightened mobility, the impermanence of employment, and the massive entrance of women into the workforce are obvious signs of this change. In March, 2000, the European Council held the Lisbon Summit, where participants were charged with developing fresh ideas for resolving ominous problems in sustaining the delivery of social services and benefits. The results of that discussion have been available for a couple of years now. They merit a second look.²⁶

Life is full of ironies, big and small, and weird coincidences. The first time I visited Lisbon, in 1967, I got to know the *livrarias* around the area of the *Igreja de São Roque*. One, I remember, was called *Os Anarchistas*. (The name did not appear to bother the authorities of the Salazar regime.) I arrived a day early for the Congresso and returned to the area. *Os Anarchistas* has long disappeared, replaced, I think, by a hair-styling salon.

I made a discovery in a nearby *livraria*. There, for five euros, I bought a copy of *Portugal de Hoje*, written by one Noël de Arriaga. It was published in 1956 under the auspices of the *União Nacional*. The book was part of a series promoted by the *Plano de Educação Popular* to commemorate the 30th

²⁴Grace Davie, *Europe: The Exceptional Case* (London: Darton, Longman, 2002).

²⁵Stein Ringen, 'Fewer People: A Stark European Future,' *Times Literary Supplement* (13 maio 2003).

²⁶Gosta Eping-Anderson et al., *Why We Need a New Welfare State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

anniversary of the national revolution—the military golpe that took place in 1926 and that soon after brought Salazar to power. At this point, weird coincidence starts to border on the hallucinatory.

Portugal de Hoje is free of *auto-crítica*. It is full of sentences like the following:

*Muito, muito mais haveria assinalar. Portugal encontrou de novo a linha interrompida da sua missão civilizadora e crê ardentemente que, pelo valor dos seus filhos e supremos desígnios da Providência, o seu lugar no mundo lhe foi determinado para realizar os altos feitos que o futuro tornará patentes aos olhos perturbados dos mais cépticos.*²⁷

The present Congresso was organized to commemorate the other revolution, of 1974, 30 years ago. This time *auto-crítica* has been abundant. There is another difference. The flip side of criticism is tolerance. There is some reason to believe that the *estado crítico* will not overwhelm the *estado cívico*.²⁸ The Congresso itself was an event that expressed a paradoxical virtue of democracy: the solidarity of pluralism.

At the concluding reception held in the *sede* of the Associação on Rua da Misericórdia I met a member who looked to be in his late fifties and who had traveled from Canada to attend the Congresso. He was wearing a polyester and rayon team jacket, with the name of a dead *companheiro* stitched on the left breast. The Montreal chapter of the Associação was named after the fallen hero. Though it was difficult to make out what was said in the din of the surrounding conversation, I understood that the officer in whose honor the jacket was worn was a ‘*puro*,’ a leader above politics, without personal ambition.

It strikes me that, like many groups in Portugal, the *militares* are struggling to come to terms with the threefold legacy of *25 de Abril*. Like the legacy of almost all revolutions, it is equivocal, even contradictory. To begin with, there is the overthrow of the ancien regime. Whatever has taken its place, old Portugal is not coming back. Liberation worked.

Second, there are the unintended consequences of the revolution. These are side-effects that no one counted on or could control. Think, for example, of the extraordinarily high ratio of primary and secondary school teachers that Portugal has certified, to meet the rapid increase in student numbers in the wake of the revolution, and now finds difficult to employ, because of a declining student population.

Third, there has been counter-mobilization against programs advanced by members of the revolutionary coalition. Obvious examples include changes in what many considered the ‘maximalist’ provisions of the revolutionary constitution.

So, the outcome of *25 de Abril* has been equivocal—more positively, pluralist. This ambiguity is a great, exasperating achievement compared to the stagnant uniformity prized in the old days. During the Congresso, I visited the *Escola de Belas Artes* across the street from the Hotel Altis where guest participants stayed. There was an exposition of paintings by Manuel Amado. All the paintings showed quiet scenes of Lisbon and Setúbal rendered with an almost Vermeer-like luminosity. The paintings, large-scale still lifes, were

²⁷Noël de Arriaga, *Portugal de Hoje* (Lisboa: União Nacional, 1956), 180.

²⁸See Paul Rogat Loeb, ed., *The Impossible Will Take a While: A Citizen's Guide to Hope in a Time of Fear* (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

beautiful yet disturbing, like a sunlit mausoleum. All were cityscapes without a scrap of dirt or litter. There were no automobiles, no machines, and there were no people. Everything was impeccably empty.

The paintings have a powerful attraction; I bought a copy of the exposition catalog for my brother-in-law. The legacy of *25 de Abril* is something different, messier and more humane.